



MANAGING TECHNOLOGY. DRIVING RESULTS.

Pretty Good Row Level Security

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The evolution of data security is not over

- ❑ Complex architectures
 - 1970 – Democratization of the Mainframe
 - 1980 – 2 tier applications relying on Mainframe
 - 1990 – 3 tier applications with multiple databases (introduction of EAI middlewares)

- ❑ First IT generation
 - First IT professional with 100% of carrier in IT are retiring now

- ❑ New public / end users with new channels
 - Human to Human
 - Kiosk and Voice Response Unit to Humans, Corporate servers to others (APIs)
 - Internet to Humans
 - Phones, etc to Humans

New challenges are still coming

- ❑ Shared infrastructure
 - Mainframes to multiple users
 - Multi-tiers applications create Identity Management challenges

- ❑ Data accessed by Internet Users
 - First, public information to the public (ex: corp websites)
 - Private information to customers / patients (ex: MyUHC.com)
 - Private information to public (ex: mypace)

- ❑ Outsourced IT can create risks for corporations
 - Longer lifespan of applications
 - High turnover of IT professional

Securing code and data

- ❑ First, Security is at the application level
 - Introduction of RACF and ACF2 limits access to screens

- ❑ Second, secured object oriented coding
 - Security is at the object level
 - Users and systems have access to objects

- ❑ Third, secured data repositories
 - System IDs limit read / write to entire tables, even columns

Do we need more data Security?

Well what if...

- ❑ We could limit access at the data level?

❑ AND

- ❑ We could have a solution that leverages existing and simple database protocols?

❑ AND

- ❑ We did not need to add another complex layer of security that will require resources to administer?

❑ AND

- ❑ We could use a technique that will be impermeable to IT Staff changes and won't slow down upgrade projects?

What is Row Level Security?

- ❑ One definition
 - A method of providing another level of access security in a database by exploiting existing business data

- ❑ Row Level Security is not new.
 - Oracle provides RLS as a feature (Labels Security)
 - PeopleSoft has embedded features for RLS
 - Business Objects has numerous white papers

- ❑ This presentation explores a generic way of implementing RLS by
 - Restricting user access to data based on data in the row,
 - Keeping the content of business tables unchanged
 - Not affecting application or presentation developers regardless of how users access the data.

Alternative Row Level Security Solutions

Available approaches don't meet our requirements. For example:

- ❑ “Implementing Row Level Security in SQL Server Databases” by Narayana Vyas Kondreddii recommends addition of user id as a column on secure tables.
 - http://vyaskn.tripod.com/row_level_security_in_sql_server_databases.htm
- ❑ Rask, Rubin, and Neumann offer on the Microsoft Technet site a solution based on defining views that again requires base table modifications.
 - <http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/sql/2005/multisec.msp#E3MAC>
- ❑ Kemal Erdogan presents a promising solution based on lookup tables. That doesn't require base table changes but leaves the tables unsecured in the case of direct user database access.
 - <http://www.codeproject.com/KB/database/AFCAS.aspx>

Provisos and Quid Pro Quos

- ❑ SQL Server database (MS SQL Server 2000, 2005, or 2008)
- ❑ An attribute exists in common to all tables to be secured that makes sense as a determinant of who sees what data (in the example, department id)
- ❑ Application calls passed to the database are secured by individual user id, not by a single admin user id
- ❑ We'll show only Select security; the concept can be extended to cover Update and Insert statements
- ❑ The solution presented is not optimized
 - Performance in your environment will depend on its unique characteristics



Generic Example: SQL Server Table Definition (Slide 1 of 3)

- Overall Approach: add a cross reference table that links userids to the security attributes.

User Access	
PK	<u>UserID</u>
PK	<u>Department</u>

Orders	
PK	<u>OrderID</u>
	CustomerName OrderTotal Department

Departments	
PK	<u>Department</u>
	ParentDepartment

Generic Example: SQL Server Table Definition (Slide 2 of 3)

- ❑ Creating an RLS function step 1: Protect data with Table Valued Functions requiring

```
CREATE FUNCTION [adhoc].[u_GetOrderSummary] ()
RETURNS TABLE
AS
RETURN
(
    SELECT OrderCount, Receipts
        FROM dbo.GetOrderSummary(Current_User)
)
```

- ❑ The problem: the user could key any user's id as a parameter to circumvent security

Generic Example:

SQL Server Table Definition (Slide 3 of 3)

- A solution: Prevent user logins to the application database, but enable them to a separate database that contains table valued functions that call those requiring user ids as parameters, as follows:

```
CREATE FUNCTION [adhoc].[u_GetOrderSummary] ()
RETURNS TABLE
AS
RETURN
(
    SELECT OrderCount, Receipts
           FROM dbo.GetOrderSummary(Current_User)
)
```

RLS in a reasonably complex database: The Adventure Works Examples

- The database Adventure Works is shipped in every MS SQL server application as an example.
 - It represents a company called Adventure Works
 - Business processes are all modeled and include (and is not limited to):
 - Sales
 - Production
 - HR
 - Ordering


- Two examples of Adventure Works RLS have been developed:
 - A sales person can only sell in his/her territory
 - HR professionals can only see data for employees in their assigned departments

A sales person can only sell in his/her territory (Slide 1 of 4): The Problem and Strategy

- ❑ What we are trying to solve:
 - Right now, all Sales resources perform a sale in every territory.
 - The new rule is that one can only sale in its own territory

- ❑ What we are going to do:
 - We create a function that links user ID to the Territory
 - We create a view to prevent the user from inserting a different user ID than his

A sales person can only sell in his/her territory (Slide 2 of 4): The Data Model



A sales person can only sell in his/her territory (Slide 3 of 4) The Function

```
-- based on Sales.vSalesPersonSalesByFiscalYears
```

```
TABLE VALUED FUNCTION
CREATE FUNCTION [Security].[ufnGetSalesTotals]
(
    @UserId VARCHAR(20)
)
RETURNS TABLE
AS
RETURN
(
    SELECT
        pvt.[SalesPersonID]
        ,pvt.[FullName]
        ,pvt.[Title]
        ,pvt.[SalesTerritory]
        ,pvt.[2002]
        ,pvt.[2003]
        ,pvt.[2004]
    FROM (SELECT
            soh.[SalesPersonID]
            ,c.[FirstName]
                + ' '
                + COALESCE(c.[MiddleName],
                '' )
                + ' '
                + c.[LastName] AS
            [FullName]
            ,e.[Title]
            ,st.[Name] AS [SalesTerritory]
            ,soh.[SubTotal]
            ,YEAR(DATEADD(m, 6, soh.[OrderDate]))
                AS [FiscalYear]
        FROM [Sales].[SalesPerson] sp
```

```
INNER JOIN [Sales].[SalesOrderHeader] soh
ON sp.[SalesPersonID] = soh.[SalesPersonID]
    INNER JOIN [Sales].[SalesTerritory] st
ON sp.[TerritoryID] = st.[TerritoryID]
    INNER JOIN Security.SalesAccess sa
ON sa.TerritoryID = st.[TerritoryID]
    AND sa.UserId = @UserID
    INNER JOIN [HumanResources].[Employee] e
ON soh.[SalesPersonID] = e.[EmployeeID]
    INNER JOIN [Person].[Contact] c
ON e.[ContactID] = c.ContactID
) AS soh

PIVOT
(
    SUM([SubTotal])
    FOR [FiscalYear]
    IN ([2002], [2003], [2004])
) AS pvt
)
```


A sales person can only sell in his/her territory

(Slide 4 of 4) Securing with a view

□ The Secure View


```
CREATE VIEW [Security].[vsSalesTotals]
AS
SELECT
    [SalesPersonID]
    , [FullName]
    , [Title]
    , [SalesTerritory]
    , [2002]
    , [2003]
    , [2004]
FROM Security.ufnGetSalesTotals (USER)
```

HR professionals can only see data for employees in their assigned departments (Slide 1 of 4): The Problem and Strategy

- ❑ What we are trying to solve:
 - Right now, all HR employees have access to all employee data.
 - We want to limit them and assigned them to specific departments

- ❑ What we are going to do:
 - We create a function that links user ID to the Territory
 - We create a view to prevent the user from inserting a different user ID than his

HR professionals can only see data for employees in their assigned departments (Slide 2 of 4): The Data Model



HR professionals can only see data for employees in their assigned departments

(Slide 3 of 4) The Function

```
-- based on HumanResources.vEmployee
```

```
CREATE FUNCTION [Security].[ufnGetEmployeeData]
```

```
(
    @UserID VARCHAR(20)
)
```

```
RETURNS TABLE
```

```
AS
```

```
RETURN
```

```
(
    SELECT
        e.[EmployeeID]
        ,c.[Title]
        ,c.[FirstName]
        ,c.[MiddleName]
        ,c.[LastName]
        ,c.[Suffix]
        ,e.[Title] AS [JobTitle]
        ,edh.DepartmentID
        ,dpt.Name AS [DepartmentName]
        ,shr.UserID
        ,c.[Phone]
        ,c.[EmailAddress]
        ,c.[EmailPromotion]
        ,a.[AddressLine1]
        ,a.[AddressLine2]
        ,a.[City]
```

```
, sp.[Name] AS [StateProvinceName]
, a.[PostalCode]
, cr.[Name] AS [CountryRegionName]
, c.[AdditionalContactInfo]
FROM [HumanResources].[Employee] e
INNER JOIN [Person].[Contact] c
ON c.[ContactID] = e.[ContactID]
INNER JOIN [HumanResources].[EmployeeAddress] ea
ON e.[EmployeeID] = ea.[EmployeeID]
INNER JOIN [Person].[Address] a
ON ea.[AddressID] = a.[AddressID]
INNER JOIN [Person].[StateProvince] sp
ON sp.[StateProvinceID] = a.[StateProvinceID]
INNER JOIN [Person].[CountryRegion] cr
ON cr.[CountryRegionCode]
    = sp.[CountryRegionCode]
INNER JOIN
HumanResources.EmployeeDepartmentHistory edh
ON edh.EmployeeID = e.EmployeeID
AND edh.EndDate is null
INNER JOIN Security.HRAccess shr
ON shr.DepartmentID = edh.DepartmentID
AND shr.UserID = @UserID
INNER JOIN HumanResources.Department dpt
ON dpt.DepartmentID = edh.DepartmentID
```

HR professionals can only see data for employees in their assigned departments

(Slide 4 of 4): Securing with a view

```
CREATE VIEW [Security].[vsEmployee]
AS
SELECT
    [EmployeeID]          , [Title]
  , [FirstName]          , [MiddleName]
  , [LastName]           , [Suffix]
  , [JobTitle]           , DepartmentID
  , [DepartmentName]    , UserID
  , [Phone]              , [EmailAddress]
  , [EmailPromotion]    , [AddressLine1]
  , [AddressLine2]      , [City]
  , [StateProvinceName] , [PostalCode]
  , [CountryRegionName] , [AdditionalContactInfo]
FROM Security.ufnGetEmployeeData (USER)
```

Summary

- ❑ RLS allowed us to add security controls and implement business rules on existing databases
 - The overall structure of the database stays unchanged
 - Cost of developments are low
 - Functions can be reused for future developments

- ❑ Other possible enhancements
 - Add a audit functionality: create a log of who tried to access which data and at what time (Sarbox, HIPAA and regulatory requirements)
 - Link to an LDAP like Active Directory for permanent business or security requirements

